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For at least 30 years, and with growing intensity through recurring corporate governance 
crises, public policy in many countries has been striving to encourage boards of directors 
to undertake regular evaluations. The policy push has stimulated much practical advice, 
many tools for evaluation, strong encouragement from professional bodies, and 
considerable skepticism from those being evaluated. While some scholars have sought 
to conceptualize the practice, we lack a fuller understanding that can help us see how 
the promised benefits and feared drawbacks arise. This Director Notes report reviews 
the policy context and practitioner accounts and builds frameworks for practice and 
policy analysis. The authors find that board evaluation is a multidimensional concept in 
which the interactions across the dimensions open paths to improvement of boards 
processes while also to unintended consequences. The authors then suggest avenues for 
future research and a shift in policy and practice toward greater experimentation. 
Introduction 
Following corporate failures around the world in the first years of the 2000s, and with growing 
urgency after the global financial crisis of 2007-09, the search for better corporate governance 
has looked inside the boardroom, emphasizing director independence, behavioral change, and 
a focus on relationships between directors. With that came a new and seemingly undramatic 
policy direction: to understand the impact of these changes, boards should regularly, and 
conscientiously, evaluate their performance.1  
 
The policy direction has become institutionalized, focusing attention of boards, investors, 
consultants and others on the practice, leading to widespread changes in behavior in 
corporations around the world. And while the policy demand for board evaluation started with 
listed companies, the practice has spread far beyond them, into public bodies, private firms, 
the charitable sector, and clubs and associations. This direction has begun to attract scholarly 
attention, but the limited range of work to-date suggests the need for fuller conceptual 
understanding and different approaches to research, which this paper starts to address. 
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The first wave of theorizing of corporate governance led to policy and practice changes largely 
without consideration of boards, focusing instead on the agency problem, which arises from 
the separation of corporate ownership and control.2 Agency theory suggests that information 
asymmetries between shareholders, the “principals” in a business, and the managers who run 
them as “agents” of the owners can lead self-interested managers to expropriate corporate 
resources for their own purposes, or to shirking of their responsibilities. The remedies the 
theory proposes – increased disclosure and shareholder rights, coupled with managerial 
incentives linked to shareholder value – changed the informal rules governing top management 
teams and their relations with investors. But they left the board itself largely unexamined. 
 
A shift toward greater control and interest in the mechanics of boards followed, which 
prompted the UK to adopt a code of corporate governance, which inspired other countries to 
take similar actions.3 Such codes dealt mainly with structure, while remaining silent on the 
inner workings of boards. That changed following the wave of corporate failures, in many 
countries and especially the US, in 2000-03, which opened the door for policy to move into 
the boardroom, specifically by asking boards to undertake regular assessments of their own 
performance.  
 
The impetus for board evaluation has generated much advice from professional bodies, 
consultancies, and well-intentioned directors and other practitioners, practitioner articles in 
academic journals, and practice-oriented writing by academics.4 These writings generated 
frameworks and checklists for practice, some combining ideas from employee performance 
appraisals with insights about the peculiarities of boards.5 Theoretical and empirical 
understanding of board evaluation is, however, comparatively underdeveloped. This report 
reviews the nascent but growing literature on board evaluation. Its contributions lie, first, in 
integrating ideas from existing conceptual studies; second, and drawing on institutional theory 
and attention, in taking steps towards articulating reasons for resistance to the practice; and 
third, in suggesting research that can contribute to a stronger evidence-base for policy.  
 
To achieve that, the authors review the first policy context, then advice from professional 
bodies, organizations, and individuals engaged in evaluation. Next, the authors summarize the 
academic work, reviewing conceptual papers, ones concerned with content and process 
elements, and tools for evaluation exercises, and then the handful of empirical studies to-date. 
The authors summarize these ideas in a model of themes to be considered in board evaluation, 
highlighting those best undertaken with the help of external evaluators. 
Board evaluation in policy, practice, and concept 
Concern for board evaluation has a long history, in theory if not in practice. The earliest 
mention of board evaluation in our search came from a practice-focused article in Harvard 
Business Review in 1950, in which Wilbur Blair discussed how difficult it is to appraise the 
quality of a board, but urged action by boards nonetheless.6 There is little evidence that much 
came from it.  
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A similarly skeptical account came in 1991 on the potential of self-assessment by boards, in 
his case those of non-profit organizations, which cast doubt on the “sage advice” of popular 
books opining “ideal principles of action” of boards.7  
 
As practice and policy preceded conceptual work and evidence, this report starts with a brief 
overview of the burgeoning if largely untheorized policy, professional, and practitioner 
recommendations. And assessment of academic literature follows with papers concerned with 
process and content questions, and normative analyses and tools, and conceptual thinking on 
evaluation. Then it examines the nascent empirical literature to summarize the evidence that 
can begin to inform theory.  
Policy directions 
Corporate failures in the early 1990s in the UK shone a spotlight on boards, setting a policy 
direction widely copied around the world. The Cadbury Code urged new board structures, 
including the separation of the role of chair and CEO, to overcome the agency problem arising 
from the separation of ownership and control. The Cadbury Committee deliberated over 
recommending board evaluations only to back away. A first move toward institutionalization 
came from the Toronto Stock Exchange, which in 1994 sought self-assessments by listed 
company boards and disclosures about this and 13 other guidelines. The first French corporate 
governance code also recommended regular board evaluation, with disclosure. In the early 
years, acceptance was somewhat slow.8  
 
The collapse in the early 2000s of Enron, WorldCom, and many others in the US, and in other 
countries (e.g. Parmalat/Italy, HIH/Australia, Ahold/Netherlands), brought new concern about 
boardroom behavior and the relationships between directors, which led to attention to 
evaluation. The policy spread informally, from recommendations by director associations and 
stock exchanges into codes of best practice: boards should systematically appraise their own 
performance. In the US, the National Association of Corporate Directors (NACD) issued a 
“Blue Ribbon Commission” report urging adoption of regular self-assessment. The New York 
Stock Exchange recommended annual board self-evaluations in its listing rules, while a new 
UK code  recommended the practice for larger companies. That code’s spirit then informed 
codes in other countries and multilateral guidance. These recommendations met with broad, if 
somewhat reluctant, compliance. 
 
The 2007-09 global financial crisis brought renewed policy initiatives. The King corporate 
governance code in South Africa in 2009 recommended board evaluations, giving boards 
discretion over whether to conduct them internally or to use an external adviser. A renamed 
UK Corporate Governance Code  retained much of the language on board evaluation from 
2003 while adding a further recommendation: board evaluations at the 350 largest listed 
companies “should be externally facilitated at least every three years”; boards should also state 
whether the external facilitator had “any other connection” with the company. Through 
subsequent revisions this recommendation remained. This time the idea gained increasing 
acceptance  and in policy beyond the UK .9 Such a generic specification leaves much discretion 
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with boards and their chairs; moreover, the recommendation falls under the general comply-
or-explain provision of the code, making its application voluntary. 
 
The new policy direction was copied in other jurisdictions in the next few years, and advocated 
by professional bodies and other authorities. As codes of corporate governance increasingly 
advocated the practice, professional bodies and consultants beat a drum to energize 
compliance.  
Practitioner experiences 
Through the 1990s, a board consultant who had worked with Cadbury and on development of 
other national codes, identified growing shareholder pressure for board “performance and 
conformance.” Writing in an academic journal, Bob Garratt urged both director development 
and assessment of boards as ways to professionalize their work without providing specific 
recommendations about how to conduct evaluations.10 
 
As the practice began to develop, various writers made pleas for action in the pages of Harvard 
Business Review.11  As it proliferated, so did recommendations of professional bodies, think 
tanks, and consultants.  Building upon her doctoral study of non-executive directors and her 
work as a professional board evaluator, Tracy Long declared director evaluation “this year’s 
model.” The phrase seemed to capture a dilemma in emerging practice: Descriptively, she 
identified that evaluation had become fashionable, with growing numbers of checklists, 
questionnaires, and toolkits. Normatively, she argued that evaluation processes should re-
examine each year’s contingencies in the business environment, rather than following a strict 
template.12  
 
Despite all this backing, the practice has met resistance. A global survey by McKinsey, which 
included improving board performance as one of its investigations, found only 20 percent of 
directors thought individual evaluations of directors were excellent or very good, while 42 
percent thought the process needed improvement or needed significant improvement.13 
Directors report difficulties with achieving candor, raising concern that evaluation will lack 
rigor owing to director non-engagement with the process.14 Reviewing 16 countries, the 
recruitment firm Spencer Stuart found that 43 percent of UK firms used external facilitators, 
but only 12 percent of companies in Norway, Sweden, and Finland did, and no Polish company 
reported the practice.15  
 
Many of these discussions adopt a common-sense approach, often focusing on the content of 
the evaluation, rather than the process, and largely unsupported by theory. Some invoke 
analogies to the value of employee performance appraisal as justification, while others just 
assume the effort brings value. What they often lack is both conceptualization of board 
evaluation and empirical evidence from practice.  
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Conceptualizing board evaluation 
Most attempts to build a more conceptual view of board evaluation consider content and 
process questions together or identify tools for use in the process. Our reading of the literature 
also finds a small number go further, seeking to build frameworks for research or practice. 
 
Content and process. What should boards evaluate, and how should they do it? Drawing on 
their experiences with several large US firms, Conger et al. identify two types of subjects for 
evaluation: board activities (strategy development, implementation monitoring, etc.) and 
resources available to the board (e.g. knowledge, skills, information, the board’s authority, 
director motivation, time).16  
 
On process,  Kiel, Nicholson, and Barclay describe seven steps, identifying: the objectives, 
who will be evaluated, what subject the process will cover, who will be asked, what techniques 
will be used, who will conduct the evaluation, and what will happen with the results.17  
Minichilli et al. condense these into four: the agent who evaluates, the content to be evaluated, 
the addressee or audience of the evaluation, and the method of evaluation.18 Both these 
approaches have been widely cited and seem to inform practice-based accounts.  
 
In a short paper aimed mainly at practitioners, Daily and Dalton urge formalized processes 
including measurable variables and well-developed instruments for three levels of data 
collection (board, committees, and directors). They highlight the “who evaluates” question, 
asking boards to consider whether the process should be led by the board as a whole, the chair, 
an external facilitator, or a governance committee monitoring board performance. They also 
advise that evaluations should be backed by a data retention policy, because, under US law, 
such documents might be discoverable in lawsuits.19 They thus imply an outside audience. 
 
Epstein and Roy urge a catalogue of issues for evaluation: board structures, director 
knowledge and skills, information systems and codes of ethics, and for the CEO a 360-degree 
appraisal modelled on the popular human resources practice for employees, and seeking views 
from a variety of outside stakeholders. Schmidt and Brauer fear evaluation processes might 
leave out board contributions to strategy by focusing on issues highlighted in governance 
metrics. They propose a process that includes formal strategy consistency analysis.20  
 
Tools for evaluation. The content and process literature and practitioner accounts of 
evaluation diverge about the   tools needed to assess boards. Should they use metrics to create 
rigor, or observation to seek out nuances in behavior and dynamics? Should they be 
standardized for comparability, or individualized to the contingencies of the firm, industry, 
and contemporary concerns? Proliferation of practice has led to tools for board evaluation. 
Some work from roots in the content and process discussion, incorporating board-specific 
issues; others are oriented in employee-oriented performance appraisal. They are often based 
on practical experience, some with anchors in theories of board effectiveness.  
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Heracleous and Lan offer a 20-question tool to evaluate directors, focusing on their knowledge 
and skills, that is, inputs to board work, but not their behavior or performance. Aly and 
Mansour reconstruct the balanced scorecard to take into account customer-oriented metrics to 
the work of boards.21  
 
Some of the instruments focus on board improvement. For example, Van den Berghe and 
Levrau offer a framework seeking the right fit of directors to the circumstances of the firm, 
while shying away from measurement.22  Likierman presents a 10-question guide to encourage 
conversation, and then urges face-to-face discussion to iron out issues between directors.23 
Other instruments point firmly at external consumption. In the UK, the Institute of Directors 
suggests using a “good governance index,” seeking to make assessment verifiable to external 
stakeholders.24 
 
Conceptual studies. In one of a series of early studies concerning board practice and 
evaluation, Ingley and Van der Walt  consider the knowledge and skills directors need for their 
work on strategy, with implications for director selection and board evaluation.25 They draw 
attention to the business context, economics and industry dynamics, the impact of legislation 
and regulation, and ownership issues. They then focus on board composition, director 
characteristics and interpersonal relations as contributors to board effectiveness. Their model 
becomes, in effect, a framework for board evaluation focused on improving board 
effectiveness.  
 
Developing a theme from their work on board effectiveness, the practitioner-academics Kiel 
and Nicholson discuss three of the seven steps in their process as categories: 
 
• First, objectives may be for 1) “corporate leadership”, such as demonstrating 
commitment to performance or to director developments; or 2) resolving problems. [In 
a later paper,  list five reasons for conducting evaluations: identifying areas for 
improvement, presenting a model of good performance to the executives and 
managers, signaling to stakeholders, complying with regulation, and protecting 
directors, each of which can be seen as components of the original two.]  
• Second, audiences may be internal to the board, or external, including employees as 
well as outside parties.  
• Third, who evaluates may involve board-internal evaluations or ones led by external 
facilitators.26 
 
Minichilli et al. discuss the final two of these dimensions as continua, rather than dichotomies. 
Audiences for the results range from directors as individuals, to committees, academics or 
other researchers, external committees, investors, or regulators, increasingly distant from the 
board. Evaluators may be directors themselves, a board committee, consultants, researchers, 
or independent external agents. They discuss objectives in terms of the purpose of the 
evaluation, and their analysis of purpose points toward external considerations of 
accountability and reputation, and internal ones of board culture and knowledge resources.27  
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Taking a direction focused on data, Stybel and Peabody identify four categories of board 
evaluations:  
 
1) the informal, where confidentiality is less important and collection is less structured, 
2) the legalistic, with a low structure of collection of information where confidentiality is 
important;  
3) the trusting, in which less sensitive data are gathered in a structured way; and 
4) the systematic, with structured collection of the confidential data as well. They see 
boards evolving from the informal toward the systematic as they gain familiarity with 
and shed anxiety about the process.28  
 
Other studies, however, cast a critical eye on how board evaluations will be seen and used.   
Jauncey and Moseley-Greatwich worry that evaluation processes may lead to categorization 
of directors in ways that will inhibit their participation, arguing for evaluations of individuals’ 
behavior to be assessed by keeping definitions fluid. Long notes that even though evaluations 
may start as self-improvement exercises, shareholders may expect more drastic action. She 
argues that associated with template-driven approaches, board evaluations can become blunt 
instruments, lacking in sensitivity to context.29  
 
Board evaluation processes may also lose the confidence of the directors themselves if, like 
employee appraisals, they come to be seen as instruments of discipline by external audiences, 
as well as their board colleagues. In a study for the Dutch Central Bank in its supervisory role 
over financial services companies, Groothuis notes that directors are often wary that external 
facilitators may not understand the complexities of the issues boards face.30 Griffin et al. think 
evaluation exercises will falter if directors become disengaged from the process.31  
 
Why would they? Because Nicholson et al., among others, see a split in the internal uses: 
evaluations may lead to director development, or to changing the mix of knowledge and skills 
on the board.32 The latter may involve changing selection criteria for new directors, but another 
use may be to orchestrate the departure of directors the evaluators deem to be 
underperforming.  
Empirical evidence 
These conceptual analyses raise issues that can only be decided empirically, work that is still 
in its infancy. It is clustered around work by a handful of pioneering teams of scholar-
practitioners. Others are small-scale qualitative studies, on specialized sectors, specialized 
problems, descriptive surveys, or based only on public disclosures.33 
 
An early empirical study of board evaluation by Ingley and Van der Walt views board 
evaluation as an inherently political process. In this qualitative account of New Zealand 
boards, directors warn of “mindless checklists” and “over-engineering.”34 An undercurrent in 
their comments, however, is that horizontal evaluation – by peers – involves different 
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political/power constellation than vertical appraisals in employment relations. Some saw 
evaluation by and of peers as a threat to board cohesion. Such political issues were among the 
reasons boards decided not to undergo evaluation. In a survey of UK company secretaries,  
Dulewicz and Herbert find evidence that board evaluations is instrumental in boardroom 
change, influencing director selection and also leading to decisions by directors to resign.35  
 
More recent studies, conducted as the practice began to be more prevalent, show board-internal 
benefits arising from evaluation. In a report for an association of pension investors in 
Australia, the academic researchers Clarke and Klettner see board evaluations leading to 
outcomes including changes to process, to committee structures, and even to board 
composition to address dysfunction.36  
 
Looking at boards of small Norwegian firms, Nordqvist and Minichilli find strong support 
among directors surveyed for the of use of “board maintenance” tools, such as regular board 
evaluations. Regular evaluation was associated with stronger director involvement in strategy 
issues, resource provision, and monitoring.37 Machold et al., who also studied small 
Norwegian firms, use board evaluations as a component of an independent variable termed 
“board development”, which then contribute significantly to team production of strategy.38 
Their method was not able to isolate the impact of evaluations themselves, however. In a 
conference paper reporting on a survey of chairs of 89 Canadian listed companies, Roy finds 
that firms with highly articulated board performance evaluation systems were associated with 
higher quality director feedback, improvement in board effectiveness, engagement with 
strategy and monitoring, and return of assets.39 
 
Similarly, Del Brio et al., in a study of 160 directors of companies in Canada, Spain, and 
Singapore, find evidence that conducting regular board evaluations is associated with the 
directors’ effort in resource provision and with directors’ perception of the CEOs 
trustworthiness, measured by CEOs’ ability, benevolence, and integrity. But in their study, 
evaluation is not clearly linked to directors’ monitoring role.40  
 
Other empirical studies offer suggestions of topics only partially captured in conceptual work. 
The lack of detail in public disclosure raises questions about the degree to which board 
evaluation can attempt simultaneously to satisfy internal purpose of board development and 
accountability to external parties. Current policy initiatives seek only limited disclosure, but 
the literature the authors reviewed includes normative calls for much more complete public 
discussion.  
 
A recent interview-based study identifies the mixed views of the directors toward the benefit of the use of 
external facilitators, although the results would be taken more seriously there was concern regarding the 
ability of the evaluator. As the practice expands to an increasing range of organization types, it suggests 
a need to consider ways of professionalizing the process.41 That echoes normative views in which 
evaluation leads to professionalization of directors themselves and a practitioner-led attempts to codify 
evaluation processes and certify evaluators. A thematic summary of the literature appears in  
Table 1 (see below). 
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Toward a theory of board evaluation 
Conceptual work and the nascent empirical literature point toward a need to integrate themes 
into a more comprehensive understanding if we are to be able to develop a theoretical view of 
board evaluation. This section draws together these ideas and incorporate anxieties about the 
process, potential downsides, and the risks of manipulation of its intent to synthesize our 
knowledge of evaluation and develop an agenda for further research.  
An integrative view 
In integrating these conceptualizations, it is helpful to note that three of the seven steps 
advanced by Kiel and Nicholson involve dichotomies: the types objectives served by board 
evaluation, the audiences served, and who evaluates, each with internal and external 
dimensions.42 The four-step process in Minichilli et al. yields an analytic framework focused 
on audiences and evaluators, with the third (objectives) reflected in the purpose of 
evaluation.43 These dimensions focus attention on certain parts of rules of the game, 
embedding those while also limiting the ability of actors to pay heed to others. This approach 
helps us to present observations based on empirical and normative studies to build a more 
nuanced understanding of board evaluation.  
 
Objectives. In the various works of Kiel and Nicholson, the diverse possible objectives fall 
into two categories: 1) demonstrating commitment to performance and good governance, and 
2) problem resolution. The former suggests a symbolic function associated with 
accountability; the latter is operational, concerned with effectiveness. Their discussion of the 
implications and those of normative writings of other scholars and practitioners suggest that 
both types of objectives are important and warrant the attention of boards.  
 
However, regulations and codes of best practice increasingly urge disclosure of the 
information about the evaluation process, with the danger the practice will value form over 
substance. If boards come to view evaluations principally as symbolic, there is a danger the 
process can be used in a manipulative way. Such an issue is already well documented in the 
corporate governance literature, in the ways that boards engage in symbolic management to 
manipulate how financial markets evaluate firm performance, particularly on non-financial 
matters.44 This concern lies beneath the recommendations in McIntyre and Murphy of the 
possibility of “board agency” and their call for even greater disclosure about evaluation 
work.45  
 
Audiences. Similarly, the uses and therefore users of evaluations involve two types of 
audience: the board itself and external parties. Among the former, Kiel and Nicholson cite 
benefits for the organization, the board, and directors arising from leadership, role clarity, 
decision-making, communication, operations, and teamwork. Among the latter, they mention 
accountability to employees, customers, suppliers, and other stakeholders. In the current 
policy-led environment, regulators and stock exchanges may be added. Minichilli et al. urge 
us to consider audiences as a continuum between the narrowest (an individual director) and 
   10  
the most distant (regulators). Stybel and Peabody, rather provocatively, add potential bidders 
looking to take over the company, as well as providers of directors and officers (D&O) 
insurance. 46 
 
External and internal audiences both benefit from the increased accountability of the board, 
but it may be useful to recall that the type of accountability may differ. The external audience, 
and in particular shareholders of listed firms, represent a hierarchical or vertical accountability, 
which Roberts calls “individualizing” in that it holds individuals to account.47 The internal 
audience, however, made up of fellow directors, represents a horizontal accountability, echoed 
in directors’ concerns over the potential for a loss of cohesiveness and wariness about using 
instruments of appraisal of subordinates’ performance in the evaluation of peers. This type of 
accountability is what Roberts calls “socializing”, in which face-to-face encounters over 
extended periods of time may overcome the agency problem through generation of collective 
will. Here, again, attention to the outward-facing, hierarchical accountability may lead to 
boards becoming less attentive to the interpersonal accountability and thus overlook that side 
of board evaluation. 
 
Who evaluates.  Kiel and Nicholson pose a dichotomy between evaluations conducted 
internally (led by the chair, an independent director, or a committee) and those conducted with 
external assistance (through general advisers or specialist consultants). Again, Minichilli et al. 
bring a nuance to their framework by suggesting a continuum between internally conducted 
self-assessments, to assigning the role to a board committee, using consulting firms that know 
the company, employing researchers even less connected to the firm, or an external specialist. 
This range of actors suggests a growing degree of independence of the evaluator from the 
evaluated.  
 
The literature shows skepticism about the effectiveness of self-assessment. The executive 
search firm Spencer Stuart advises that self-evaluation is insufficient as a route to board 
improvement, while Long advocates external evaluation for its greater objectivity.48 These are 
interested parties, to be sure, both interested in promoting external facilitation. But while parts 
of the literature show skepticism about external facilitation, the recent policy push seems to 
have created greater familiarity with the process, less concerns about potential downsides, and 
growing understanding of the benefits. 
 
The difficulty here is understanding what external facilitation entails. For example, a 
practitioner-focused magazine article  describes a self-assessment exercise that uses an outside 
party to gather and analyze data.49 Some self-assessments use templates devised by external 
parties for their presumed expert construction and their ease of application. This may help a 
board that lacks expertise in evaluation. But it also focuses attention on form over substance, 
which then institutionalizes into a shallow process or even a merely symbolic one.  
 
 
Integrating the dimensions. The frameworks of Kiel and Nicholson and Minchilli et al. 
are often cited in the developing academic literature and echoed in practitioner-focused 
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accounts, which attests to their usefulness. The discussion above suggests, however, a need 
for greater attention to the potential downsides of board evaluation. For example, on the “board 
improvement” aspect of the “objectives” dimension, and for internal audiences and pertaining 
to self-evaluation, empirical accounts suggest concerns about political undercurrents 
associated with director removal. To what extent these lead to consolidation of boardroom 
power and the stifling of debate? Using external facilitators is meant to increase objectivity 
and remedy the political element, but their engagement could be symbolic as much as 
substantive, owing to information asymmetries subject to capture under the direction of, say, 
a manipulative chair. Such concerns seem to underpin the calls for professionalization from 
practitioners, and as reported by scholars.50 
Things to consider 
The practice and normative academic literatures and policy directives often describe these 
dichotomies as “both-and” choices, rather than “either-or”. The empirical literature is 
insufficient to guide practice in favor of one direction rather than the other. For example, 
findings on how evaluations affect directors’ contributions to strategy, monitoring, and 
resource provision have shown mixed results in the handful of studies conducted to-date. This 
points to the need to develop the nascent literature further and to consider issues that so far 
have received only scant attention. These include: 
 
Uses and audiences. Data on characteristics feed into the governance ratings used by 
investors and therefore have uses by external audiences. Policy has encouraged disclosure of 
increasing amounts of such data, not just about evaluation itself, but also data on director 
knowledge and skills, and proxies for effort norms (e.g. attendance at board and committee 
meetings) that contribute to board effectiveness. Yet we do not know how well such data 
indicate effectiveness without understanding how the evaluation of individual characteristics 
and behavior affect board decision processes. As the authors have argued elsewhere,51 when 
evaluation is intended as a tool for internal improvement, rather than for public consumption, 
it is important to consider the individual’s strengths, the collective abilities of the board, and 
how board processes and input contribute to the outcomes (see Figure 1). 
 
Process questions. Discussion in the literature about the timing and frequency of 
evaluations has been led by the policy direction: annual evaluations, less frequent but regular 
external facilitation. Less discussed are the circumstances under which evaluation might yield 
the greatest insights. For example, Stybel and Peabody worry about the possibility that a 
scheduled board evaluation might coincide with a major event (e.g. an initial public offering) 
and distract directors with questionnaires to complete.52 Yet that might be precisely the time 
to ask an external evaluator to observe board practice to assess interpersonal relations. 
Qualitative, ethnographic and case study research could help us determine what types of 
evaluations are beneficial in what types of circumstances. 
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Figure 1 - Board evaluation process map (© Nordberg and Booth) 
Implications for practice and policy 
In a strongly policy-led field, there is a danger that practice may ignore the evidence. These 
multiple dimensions point toward complex approaches to board evaluation, which can be 
assembled in ways that deal with the peculiar circumstances of a board, at a particular time, in 
setting its objectives for internal development and the interpersonal accountability between 
directors. Demands of outside parties for vertical accountability may be satisfied by more 
systematic collection of data and publication of subsets of it that show the rigor. Equally, 
external audiences may draw sufficient comfort from the use of respected, professionally 
accredited facilitators. The discussion above leads us to wonder whether any one formula can 
satisfy the demands for board development and external accountability, that is, whether 
institutionalizing the process in detail is likely to lead to unintended consequences, and 
whether if recognized these can be outweighed by the importance of the process to safe-guard 
the company against those directing it.  
Conclusions 
Almost 70 years ago, in the pages of Harvard Business Review, Blair posed the puzzle of 
board appraisal, but asked corporations to take it seriously nonetheless. In the intervening 
decades, corporate governance has emerged as a major theme of corporate and public policy, 
exposing board processes to scrutiny, not least to identify ways like frequent evaluation for 
boards and directors to become more effective in keeping imperious CEOs and wayward 
management in check.  
 
Writing much more recently in Harvard Business Review, Sonnenfeld et al. turned the 
spotlight in the opposite direction, asking CEOs to evaluate their boards. Their anecdotal 
accounts show CEOs concerned about the timidity of outside directors, their status-
consciousness, and their reluctance to stand down. They see these traits as impediments to 
corporate purpose, for example, preventing them from agreeing to accept a takeover bid that 
would benefit shareholders.53  
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These differing views point to the tensions concerning the nature of corporate governance, the 
forms of accountability, and the purposes and processes of board evaluation. This report 
suggests that board evaluation is a multidimensional practice that involves the complex 
interaction of concepts the consequences of which is just starting to be understood. If we 
regard the practice as a series of natural experiments, then policy might then be adjusted, in 
small steps.  It might be taken as an opportunity to gather evidence, in ways that preserve the 
spirit of experimentation, thus avoiding premature institutionalization and providing a more 
solid base for a future policy regime. For boards, this report identifies many paths of 
experimentation, across multiple dimensions. Greater experience, across a broader range of 
cases, will help board identify what works, when, and for whom.  
 
Table 1 - Advantages, drawbacks of board evaluation 
 Element Benefits Drawbacks, sources of potential manipulation Comment 
O
b
je
ct
iv
e
s 
Board 
development 
Formal CEO evaluation 
benefits director resource 
provision; board 
evaluation benefits 
strategy work; in small 
firms monitoring as well; 
“exemplar” evaluations 
show benefit in profits  
 
Addresses “elephant in the 
room”; assesses 
knowledge, skills of 
directors; performance; 
understanding individuals, 
group; opens dialogue on 
strategy; board evaluation 
as mechanism to examine 
“constructive” conflict, 
“interpersonal cohesion”; 
benefits for board 
effectiveness  
Formal CEO evaluation 
process not significant 
for director monitoring  
 
Board evaluation may 
be used to mechanism 
to squeeze out directors  
Value pivots on intent: e.g. 
orchestrating departures 
can be beneficial to firm or 
become mechanism for 
concentrating power. 
 
Focus on legitimacy at 
expense of board 
development can lead to 
symbolic management  
Legitimacy 
Signals commitment to 
shareholder value; 
conformance; benefits for 
external perceptions of 
board favorable D&O 
insurance  
Risk of creating paper 
trail of deficiencies; 
disclosures vague  
A
u
d
ie
n
ce
s 
Internal 
Trustees (of non-profits) 
view benefits as board-
internal, see little benefit 
for outsiders; evaluation 
viewed as having intrinsic 
value to directors, rather 
than value creation for 
firm  
 
In family firms, formal 
board evaluation 
overcomes “fault-lines” 
becoming crises  
 
Value of evaluation may 
come from less obvious 
sources; evaluation can 
help set aside internal board 
hierarchies, re-establishing 
directors as equals; 
presence of evaluation 
influences perceptions 
concerning control 
processes also as 
contributing to value 
creation, not just value 
preservation 
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External 
Consider non-traditional 
stakeholders, i.e., D&O 
insurers; also potential 
acquirers; think of 
regulators as audience  
 
W
h
o
 e
v
a
lu
a
te
s 
Board internal 
Self-assessment brings 
benefits to board strategy 
work  
 
Chair-led evaluations 
commonplace; need for, 
issues in evaluation of 
chair; by lead non-
executive director  
Self-assessments 
sometimes involve 
outsiders, blurring 
distinctions between 
the two forms; internal 
assessment never 
sufficient  
Points to relevance of 
viewing issue as a 
continuum  
 
Questions raised: 
External verification of 
factual content of self-
assessments? 
 
Need to professionalize 
board evaluators; verify 
evaluation reports? 
External 
facilitator 
Creates objectivity, open 
avenue to discuss 
interpersonal issues  
Resistance to outsiders 
in boardroom; 
objectivity requires 
professionalism of 
evaluators  
 
Growing scope of 
board evaluation raises 
issue of capacity, 
evaluator skills 
E
v
a
lu
a
ti
o
n
 p
ro
ce
ss
e
s 
Systematic 
Formal tools ensure rigor, 
enhance accountability; 
questionnaires can capture 
good view of inputs to 
board processes; 
contingencies can be 
addressed through 
examination of business 
environment  
Director concern over 
“mindless checklists”, 
“over-engineering” of 
process; concern over 
political aspects in 
“horizontal” (peer) 
evaluation as opposed 
to “vertical” appraisal 
of employees  
 
US-style rules-based 
approach perfunctory ; 
paralysis by analysis; 
form over substance; 
risks unhelpful 
categorization of 
directors  
Formality can impede 
ability to see, 
understanding board 
dynamics, interpersonal 
relations, contingencies of 
business; risk of 
increasingly detailed 
assessment through 
sedimentation of additional 
requirements 
Contingent 
Structure, content of 
evaluation can be sensitive 
to contingencies in board 
structure, firm lifecycle, 
culture; directors value 
flexibility  
 
C
o
n
te
n
t 
Board 
processes 
Focus of evaluation on 
activities and resources of 
the board, emphasizing 
strategic role; inputs, 
including information; 
processes, including 
information management  
 
Content-oriented analyses 
look mainly at inputs 
(knowledge, skills, 
information), structures 
(board design, committees), 
and activities (meeting 
schedules, agendas, 
attendance); this focus may 
overlook relational issues Interpersonal 
Interpersonal development 
viewed as prime benefit of 
evaluation process  
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W
h
o
 i
s 
e
v
a
lu
a
te
d
 
Comprehensive 
Evaluation can get to three 
levels: board, committees, 
directors  
Lack of engagement 
threatens success of 
evaluation  
Structure of evaluation 
process, not just the 
evaluation itself, can be a 
political decision, with 
beneficial and manipulative 
outcomes, provoking 
resistance to process, loss 
of candor 
Selective 
CEO evaluation different: 
consider 360-degree 
including external 
stakeholders  
 
Audit committee 
evaluation results reveals 
lack of attention to skills 
development  
 
Decision whether to 
evaluate CEO contingent 
on organization 
circumstances  
 
Evaluation of chairs 
important, as leadership is 
crucial to board 
effectiveness  
Resistance to 
evaluation of individual 
directors  
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